CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
CSCE AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to take the floor here this afternoon. I have been asked to share my thoughts with you on the future role of the Helsinki process in the security of Europe: what are the needs for European security and what is the role the CSCE might play in the
emerging European security order.
I would wish to begin by congratulating the newly established Institute for Cooperation on Security, Economics and the Environment for holding its inaugural event on such a timely and worthy theme. I hope this is a good omen for the institute's future work.
We are engaged today in the making of a new order of security and co-operation in Europe - a continent in a process of a complex and unpredictable change.
In historical terms, division and confrontation is being replaced by a unity based on democracy and economic liberty.
In concrete terms, the political and institutional transformation to achieve that goal is underway but at best still frought by uncertainties.
The Charter of Paris attributed the liberation of Europe from the cold war to "the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final Act". what happened in 1989-1990 has been rightly seen as a revolution. But the year since the historic Paris Summit has shown us that political change continues to be the underpinning force of a new European order.
First and foremost in our minds are the efforts of remaking of the Soviet Union. The aborted coup in August has been followed by the rise of sovereign republics, negotiating a new union among themselves. Change and instability in the largest country and a major military power in the continent will preoccupy us and dominate the political and security agenda for the foreseeable future.
In Yugoslavia, the failure of a peaceful transition has led to tragic consequences. There is a full-scale war going on in Europe. Even if not a harbinger of things to come but rather a special case in its causes, it calls for an open analysis and requires urgent action for European conflict prevention and management.
In Eastern and Central European countries, undergoing a transition to democracy and market economy, domestic political instability seems to be matched with a determination to join in the process of unification in Europe. At the same time, these countries actively strive tor efficient new arrangements for their national security.
Finally, political integration in Western Europe will have a profound effect on the new European architecture, it will determine the future role of the European Community and its impact on European security. Furthermore, the political development of the EC will affect the remolding of the one remaining military alliance in Europe, NATO.
The future significance of the notion of neutrality will also be shaped by this changing constellation.
The chains of events I have outlined are not as such unexpected in the new Europe. But, at the same time, their future course is linked with greatest uncertainty.
Efforts to ensure security, stability and well-being for Europe are guided by a common political foundation enshrined in the Paris Charter. It outlines a peaceful order for Europe based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and economic liberty.
What makes this political consensus more credible is the mutual interest in preserving and strengthening the common basis of values. It is reflected in the exchange of expertise and ideas of democratic political reform, in the support to economic transition, and in the way military openness and even co-operation in military restructuring and build-down is evolving.
These are deep-going forms of cooperation creating fibres of growing interdependence.
But a new order for Europe is not only based on norms and political will. It needs an institutional structure and tools, to protect and build upon what has been achieved. A thorough thinking is required on how to cope with the security problems of the new Europe.
Even if the ultimate threats are not discarded in defence planning anywhere, Europe is not today faced with immediate dangers of inter-state wars. Limited conflicts taking different, predominantly non military forms are a more likely security threat. They can, of course, have also international dimensions.
Analysts are warning of a 'divisible' peace, inparticular in the third world, after the end of bipolarity. In Europe, we are dealing with the same type of phenomenon. An uneven degree of integration, of erratic democratic and market economy transition may create pockets of conflict and tension. They do not necessarily pose a larger threat but contradict the common values and the idea of unity, and
may create instability in the longer run.
What is most urgently needed as a regional system of security for Europe, is therefore "joint practices and institutions capable of meeting situations that arise from political, social and economic instability.
The regional system will have to comply with the political dynamics of an integrating Western Europe, to satisfy the security concerns of the countries in Eastern Central Europe and to accommodate the future roles of the great powers in Europe.
The new Europe must be based on the idea of cooperative security, which is embodied by the CSCE. it is natural that a new security system will emerge gradually from the rather imperfect situation we have today. Furthermore, it will be based on interlocking institutions linking together the CSCE countries of Europe and North America.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
This leads me to another theme of this seminar: what precisely are the institutional and other requirements for the CSCE so that it would be able to ensure peaceful historical transformation of Europe?
For the CSCE, the new threats of the new Europe pose a great challenge and a real test of strength and cerdibility. One of the basic questions will be: are the participating countries ready to provide the CSCE with the institutions and structures strong enough to meet the present and future challenges?
At the moment, we have reason to be optimistic. The CSCE has begun to respond institutionally to these challenges. The Paris Summit, created the new basic institutions and structures. The Berlin meeting of the Council established the emergency mechanism and gave the task of further developing institutions and structures to the Committee of Senior Officials. The Yugoslav crisis has in concrete terms shown, however, that the capability of the CSCE to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts should be further strenghtened and developed.
There are already proposals to create for instance a European Security Council. The aim of these proposals has obviously been to point out the need to create a collective security system for Europe, which would somehow resemble the UN global security regime. For the time being this kind of plans would perhaps go too far - although in the future they might have a chance of materialising.
It could be for the benefit of all if Europe would have rather far-reaching norms of common behavior, the deviation from which would lead to collective sanctions. The nature and the rules for implementing these sanctions should, of course, be carefully considered.
A collective security system designed specifically for Europe would require procedures resembling those established in the United Nations Charter but of course adapted to the CSCE. Any collective measure based on such procedures would not be power politics, within this kind of framework also neutral countries could participate in sactions without caontradicting their fundamental principles.
In the present situation plans like this are no doubt too far reaching. What is needed now is the development of a pragmatic and gradually proceeding European security system. In our view, this could begin by improving the functioning of the existinq CSCE institutions and structures.
The CSCE has already developed some tools for crisis management, like the emergency mechanism, Human Dimension mechanism, mechanism for unusual military activities, and mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes. There is,
however, common belief that this is not enough.
The most urgent task is to develop the operational capabilities of the CSCE institutions and structures to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. There is a need for what ran be called a comprehensive crisis management system: a process which combines all the efforts of the CSCE institutions and structures and the participating countries in conflict situations.
The functions of the respective institutions and structures should be defined at different stages of the conflict prevention and management process. The functioning of the process should be organised in a flexible and harmonious manner.
New instruments, like fact-finding, counselling, conciliation and dispute settlement, missions of rapporteur, observer and peacekeeping as well as rules of procedure for all of them, should be established and further developed.
The Committee of Senior Officials has become a focal point of activities. Between meetings of the Council, the CSO is responsible for overview and co-ordination, and acts as the Council's agent in taking appropriate decisions. A clear relationship and division of work between the CSO and the Consultative committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre should bo established. The CSO shall concentrate on
political and security matters, and the CPC shall continue to be assigned competence in military issues.
In addition to the tasks provided by the Carter of Paris, the Conflict Prevention Centre should, however, have enhanced functions in conflict prevention and crisis management and in a permanent security dialogue as well as in the implementation of measures related to military security.
The Yugoslav crisis has led to a discussion on peacekeeping operations under the CSCE auspices. The Foreign Ministers of Germany, Belgium and Austria are among those who have proposed the development of a CSCE peace-keeping function. I have given my support to these initiatives.
One might now ask whether CSCE peacekeeping efforts are required when a viable alternative with good experience is available in the form of the UN peacekeeping operations. Also, the EC and WEU are considering their own peace-keeping capabilities. Are we not creating redundancy and fostering potential disputes over spheres of authority?
In our view, there are many reasons why Europe should create a peace-keeping capacity of its own. First, the UN Charter speaks for regional measures for the maintenance of international peace and security. Second, why link non-CSCE countries to a European conflict when Europe could be in the best position to handle its own problems?
It is clear and necessary that the roles and functions of possible CSCE peacekeeping operations will have to be carefully assessed. What is undeniable - and supported by the EC monitoring experience in Yugoslavia to date - is that there is need for peacekeeping in Europe, which is based on broad consensus and co-operation, where all CSCE participating countries can take part on an equal basis.
The next step would be to develop the rules which should be observed in the CSCE peacekeeping operations.
I would like to mention only a couple of examples; the decision to initiate a peacekeeping operation should always be unanimous. All parties to the crisis should approve the operation and support it. It could involve either unarmed civilian or military observers or an actual peacekeeping force, of couse, the observers or peacekeeping forces would come from countries acceptable to all parties involved.
In the final analysis, the success or failure of European crisis management capability will depend more on the will of governments and peoples than on institutions itself. It is fundamental for CSCE peace-enhancement and peacekeeping that the parties to the conflict have the political will to arrive at a peaceful solution. In the end, the CSCE can only assist them in their efforts.
The CSCE will continue to make a major contribution to military security in Europe. The Paris Summit decided exactly a year ago that new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and security building will be launched in 1992, after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. In accordance with a decision of the Berlin meeting of the CSCE Council, informal preparations for those negotiations are underway
here in Vienna.
The Finnish perception of the new negotiations is based on a forum resting on two pillars: independent negotiations on new measures and an enhanced Conflict Prevention Centre. The CPC would also provide the venue tor the so-called security dialogue.
The new negotiations will build upon the results of earlier fora. That is why the scrupulous implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna CSBM Document assumes crucial importance.
From our point of view, the new forum will not be faced with a lack of items on its agenda. There is still plenty of room for CSBMs. Many new provisions will represent a new generation of measures reflecting new realities in Europe. Neither do we see that the time for further reductions in the conventional field is over.
Furthermore, we believe the future negotiations should also embrace a regional approach. We have reached a point where security problems and needs in different regions of the continent are no more commensurate or unidimensional. The new forum should take this; into account. Regional measures should be negotiated in a transparent and open-ended manner under the auspices of the 38 participating states.
Issues concerning the non-proliferation of various kinds of weapons and technology have been suggested as a possible element in the CSCE negotiations on military security. We share this concern. Many non-proliferation problems clearly call for global solutions best negotiated in the UN context. That notwithstanding, regional arrangements such as those negotiated by the CSCE countries — can facilitate and complement more extensive agreements.
The Helsinki process and its evolution should be viewed from the perspective of complementarity rather than substitution in relation to existing institutions. It is a mechanism for linkage rather than replacement. It enjoys certain advantages: it engages European and North American States; it has established highly tangible relationsips between the political, military, economic and human rights issues in Europe; and it has also demonstrated its capability for growth and adaptability in the turmoils of post-Cold War Europe.
The Helsinki process will evolve and grow through interaction and linkage with other European institutions as well as with subregional institutions that reflect and project the diversity of the new European order. Its proven track record, its growing degree of institutionalization, and its commitment to widening its scope in the face of new challenges - all this gives me a reason to believe that the CSCE continues to have a vital role to play in promoting stability and democracy in Europe in a period of historic change.