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Security Negotiations in Europe after Helsinki

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Statement by Dr. Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, 6 April 1992
Seminar organized by the Finnish Committee for European Security (STETE)

"Security Negotiations in Europe after Helsinki"

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Perspectives concerning the new negotiations on military security in Europe begin to take shape. The Paris Summit
in November 1990 decided that the work toward ensuring military security among the CSCE participating States
will continue after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. This new European Security Forum will be open to all CSCE
members and the arms control negotiations affecting the CSCE area will finally come under one and same roof.

Informal consultations for the new forum started in Vienna in September last year. As a result of six months of intensive preparations the Vienna negotiators forwarded to the first Chairman of the Helsinki Meeting the conclusions of their work. The national and multinational contributions submitted so far as well as the so-called perception papers prepared by the four Vienna Chairmen - Finland, Poland, Italy and Norway - offer a good and comprehensive picture of the stage of the work. Although opinions still differ in various questions, a broad consensus on the mandate - or the terms of reference - of the new negotiations is apparent. The formal negotiations which now begin in Helsinki have a solid basis and we may expect concrete results by the CSCE Summit in July.

The new Security Forum and the new negotiations will build upon the earlier achievements. This is why the commitments already agreed upon must be scrupulously implemented. Finland expects that the CFE Treaty,
rightly described as the cornerstone of European security, will be ratified soon. The CFE Treaty, the CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document 1992 and the Open Skies Treaty lay a sound basis for the new negotiations
provided that the commitments contained in them are strictly respected and put into effect.

Mr. Chairman,

Already in September last year Finland presented in Vienna a working paper outlining our views on the contours of the new Security Forum. In several statements during the informal consultations the delegation of Finland developed further the Finnish view in areas of particular relevance to us.

Let me explain in more detail what we have in mind as regards the contents and the structure of the new forum.

The European military landscape has transformed dramatically in a matter of some two years. A world characterized by military and political confrontation is being replaced by a new design resting on the joint values of pluralistic democracy, market economy and better respect for human rights. Europe of today has succeeded in reducing military threats and means of conflict. At the same time, unfortunately, there is ample evidence that the use of military force is no less unthinkable in the new Europe than it was in the past. Conflicts in Yugoslavia or in the former Soviet Union are concrete reminders of such risks. One could even maintain that many unsettled problems have become all the more visible with the disappearance of the tight straight-jacket of the opposing military alliances. There is no lack of incentives, nor is there lack of scope of further steps in conflict prevention and crisis management or new confidence- and security building- and arms reduction measures in the new CSCE.

From Finland's point of view, it is important that reductions of armed forces are extended to our neighbouring regions in the northern parts of Europe.

Therefore we would like to see the future negotiations put special emphasis on a regional - or sub-regional - approach. The capabilities of the immense amount of the treaty limited equipment and other weapons that remain in Europe even after the execution of the CFE commitments far exceed the need for secure stability. The CFE Treaty will play a key role in European security as a whole, but deep cuts in conventional forces in Central Europe are not matched by similar development in northern Europe. On the contrary, as a result of the new disarmament trend we observe more military potential relocated in our own neighbourhood. The new forum will have to be able to consider measures that address the regional imbalances.

We would wish to see measures aiming at further reductions of military forces and constraints on their activities in our region. There are specific issues concerning land, air and naval forces and activities which deserve to be jointly addressed by countries having security concerns in their own region. In addition to the measures that will be applied between all participating States, measures along border areas, enhanced transparency between neighbouring States or sub-groups of States could have a positive bearing on security in that particular region. This would not disregard the interests of the rest of Europe. Measures of regional application should be discussed and decided upon at open-ended "regional tables" among all interested parties and they would be an integral part of the new forum. Finland feels strongly that new accent should be given to local or regional concerns. We are encouraged to note that regional and selective arms control measures figure high in all the different proposals tabled at the preparatory consultations in Vienna.

Mr. Chairman,

As I said earlier, we see both need and scope for further arms control and disarmament measures in an overall CSCE context. On the one hand such measures should be measures related to the traditional "hard" arms control area, such as reductions of conventional armed forces, limitations, new stabilizing measures etc. These measures should be accompanied by adequate forms of verification. On the other hand, the future negotiations should address "softer" measures which put more emphasis on co-operation and transparency of military capabilities and activities, such as information exchange on military budgets, plans and programmes, arms transfers - as examples of extra-European questions - and military contacts between armed forces. In this area, suitable forms of verification, if needed, should be looked at on a case-by-case basis. It seems quite normal to us that the two different kinds of measures - hard and soft - may reguire a differentiated approach as far as the area of application is concerned.

A concrete work programme or a list of priority issues for the first phase of negotiations should be established already in the Follow-up Meeting.

Mr. Chairman,

Alongside the arms control negotiations, a broad security dialogue - or security cooperation dialogue - and creation of effective mechanisms for conflict prevention are the other two key domains of activity of the new European security forum. This was the conclusion of the Prague CSCE Council in January this year. A structured dialogue on the ever-growing number of European security challenges is called for. At the Paris Summit in 1990 the CSCE Heads of State entrusted the Conflict Prevention Centre and its Consultative Committee with a mandate to carry out one part of this task. At the same time the informal consultations on the terms of reference for the new forum in Vienna have clearly shown that security dialogue is something which cannot be isolated in one institution only. It should be an integral and natural part of both the negotiations and the work within the Conflict Prevention Centre. Permanent security dialogue is a crucial element of the new forum. If the dialogue disappears, we could as well do away with the term "Forum" itself.

In a negotiating context security dialogue should be understood as a two-way street. The CPC should, as Finland has suggested, serve as a clearing-house of ideas by organizing seminars or workshops on topical issues. Issues like conceptual approaches to arms control and disarmament, aspects of strategy, defence planning, national defence programmes and budgets or questions related to conversion are perfect examples of a security cooperation dialogue. They often extend to the soft arms control area, of which I spoke above.

Therefore any meaningful results of the security dialogue procedure should then be passed back to the negotiators for further development. The negotiators, for their part, once faced with a major conceptual problem should have the possibility to refer questions to the CPC. In this way the two-way street would have real meaning between the two institutional elements of the new Forum.

The enhancement of the role and functions of the Conflict Prevention Centre has been underway since the Paris Summit. The Prague CSCE Council made important decisions in this regard and the work continues now here in Helsinki. In the Finnish view, the CPC should be further enhanced as a forum for consultations in security matters and its conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities in particular. In this role, the CPC should function in close co-ordination with the Council and the Committee of Senior Officials. The Centre should also have a role in the implementation and verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, if so requested by the parties. The instruments available for the CPC should be developed to include fact-finding and rapporteur missions, monitor missions, good offices, counselling, conciliation and dispute settlement. Peace-keeping, in cooperation with the parties involved in the conflict, is a highly effective tool and would merit to be included in the CSCE arsenal of conflict resolution instruments.

Mr. Chairman,

In the Finnish view the new Security Forum will rest on autonomous negotiations on new arms control measures and an enhanced Conflict Prevention Centre. It underlines the need for an interlocking system of approaches and
actions for improving military security and stability in the enlarged area of the 51 participating CSCE States. The CSCE provides the basis for cooperation security in which security with others overides the need for security against others.

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